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THE APPLICABILITY OF EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES FOR CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE CONGRESS
THOMAS MILLET*

From the infamous Army-McCarthy hearings to the recently
concluded congressional inquiry into the Iran/Contra affair, the
processes of congressional investigating committees frequently command public attention. The televised spectacle of congressional investigations, complete with counsel whispering in witnesses' ears
and sparring with the members of Congress and their staff, has become a familiar and often compelling sight, one with the capacity to
dominate the national spotlight.
Despite the familiarity of this scenario and the importance of
the issues often at stake in these investigations for the participants
and the nation at large, relatively little guidance exists concerning
the rights and privileges of witnesses before these committees. In
particular, the question of the applicability of the familiar evidentiary privileges for confidential communications has never been definitively resolved. Clearly, Congress, like the other branches of the
federal government, is bound in its inquiries by constitutional limitations. Thus, a congressional witness retains the right to be free
from compulsory self-incrimination.' Similarly, the fourth amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures restrict the bounds of congressional action.2 Due process limits committee queries at least to the extent that they must be authorized by
the committee's charter and be relevant to the inquiry.3 Even the
first amendment rights of free speech and association have been
held to provide limited protections to witnesses before congressional
committees."
Although the constitutional rights and privileges that apply in
* Senior Trial Counsel, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. B.A., magna cum laude, 1976, University of Maryland; J.D., magna
cum laude, 1979, University of Notre Dame Law School. The views expressed in this

article are solely those of the author.
1. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
2. Id.; see also McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding
that the Speech or Debate Clause, art. I, § 6, cl. 1, does not insulate members of
Congress or their staffs from liability for unlawful searches and seizures).
3. Watkins, 354 U.S. 178.
4. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins, 354 U.S. 178.
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congressional proceedings may be stated with some certainty, the
same cannot be said for other privileges recognized by our legal tradition. Lawyers imbued with the common law's respect for a variety
of confidential communications could hardly be faulted for having
the intuitive reaction that such communications are sacrosanct, regardless of the forum. It may thus seem surprising that no controlling authority compels this result in the context of congressional investigations. This article examines the manner in which Congress
has dealt with privileges for confidential communications in the past
and assesses the legal basis for their applicability in the congressional sphere.
I.

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS:

AN OVERVIEW

In general, certain relationships have been considered important enough to society that communications within those relationships have been protected from compulsory disclosures in litigation.
The rationales for these privileges, however, are not tied solely to
judicial proceedings. They apply with the same logical force to the
legislative arena as the judicial one. On this basis alone, one would
expect that the traditional privileges for confidential communications should apply to congressional proceedings. Examination of
some of the well-established privileges illustrates this point.
For example, common law courts have traditionally protected
communications between attorney and client from compulsory disclosure in judicial proceedings. Originally drawn from an earlier
day's code of honor that communications made in confidence should
generally be respected, the attorney-client privilege subsequently
evolved to its current rationale that negotiating the legal process requires the assistance of learned counsel and that effective representation requires complete disclosure by the client and trust that the
communication will be privileged.' Clearly, disclosure of communications within the attorney-client relationship would be as equally
damaging to those interests if it occured in either a congressional
committee proceeding or in a court. Indeed, many of the most visible congressional inquests involve witnesses whose conduct is simultaneously the subject of criminal investigations. The Watergate and
Iran/Contra hearings provide recent examples of this type of inquest. As a practical matter, a congressional witness in such a proceeding may be required to put on the same "defense" in a committee room as he may be called upon to present in a courtroom, thus
raising the same need for trust and assistance of counsel in congressional investigations as is required in judicial proceedings.
5.

C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 8 J.
2291 (Rev. ed. 1961).

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
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Similarly, the marital relationship has been one that the common law and later state statutes have given a special status. Initially, husband and wife were disqualified from testifying for or
against each other.' Legislative action has generally removed this
disability and substituted in its place a testimonial privilege, recognizing a societal interest in avoiding the marital discord that would
result from compelling spouses to testify against each other.' The
interests this privilege protects are no less implicated by disclosure
in the legislative than judicial forum.
The relationship between doctor and patient has also been afforded a measure of protection in most jurisdictions.8 Among the
justifications cited for this privilege is the need to insure candid
communication between physician and patient as a means of assisting the provision of health care.' This policy similarly would apply
in the legislative and judicial context.
In short, evidentiary privileges for confidential communications
generally rest upon policy considerations that transcend the particular forum in which the inquiry is presented. These privileges are
based on judgments that simply recognize the harm that is expected
to occur to certain relationships from compelled disclosures of communications within those relationships, regardless of the forum.1"
Given that the same policy concerns are presented, the question remains as to whether Congress is required to effectuate those policies.
The following section examines Congress' responses to assertions of
privileges for confidential communications.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS

Viewed from the perspective of two hundred years of congressional experience, it is perhaps surprising that relatively few confrontations involving assertions of privileges for confidential communications have occurred. Those that have occurred are not
conclusive on the question of the applicability of the privileges to
6. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 78; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2333-34.
7. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 78; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2333-34.
8. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 98; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2380-80a.
9. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 105. The author, however, criticizes this rationale and suggests that the primary motive may be professional jealousy of the
medical sector for the privilege traditionally afforded to the legal profession. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2380a.
10. Beyond the scope of consideration here are the various governmental privileges collectively known as "executive privilege," such as the deliberative process
privilege, and the state secrets privilege. As privileges unique to the executive branch
of government, they raise separation of powers concerns that are not involved here.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S.
1 (1953).
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congressional proceedings as a matter of law. At best, they display a
practice of avoidance of the issue to the greatest extent possible.
A.

The Woolley Case

Congressional hearings during Andrew Johnson's impeachment
proceedings, investigating a scheme for bribing senators, led to Congress' earliest confrontation over the issue. A House committee investigated allegations that Charles W. Woolley, a lawyer, conspired
with others to bribe certain senators. When called as a witness, Mr.
Woolley refused to answer questions which, in his view, did not relate to either the bribery scheme or to Johnson's impeachment.
When asked whether he had sent certain telegrams to Sheridan
Shook, another member of the alleged conspiracy, Mr. Woolley asserted the matter involved a "private and confidential communication, passing between counsel and client. It has reference to business
in that relation and nothing else ... ."I Unfortunately for Mr.
Woolley, his alleged client Shook denied ever having conducted business with Woolley."5 The committee then cited Woolley for con
tempt and introduced a resolution to arrest and hold him in the
Capitol until he answered the questions. 3
The proponents of the resolution focused not on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to congressional proceedings, but
on whether the privilege had been validly asserted. Because Shook
denied conducting business with Woolley, over which Woolley
claimed the attorney-client privilege, Congressman Bingham argued
that the claim of privilege was fraudulent and deserving of a contempt citation. 4 In reply, Congressman Eldridge maintained that
this conclusion did not follow, because one could just as easily conclude that Shook may have testified falsely. In the course of his defense of Woolley, Congressman Eldridge delivered a strong plea for
the House to respect the traditional privileges for confidential
communications:
I insist this right of confidential communication between the attorney
and client is a sacred and well-settled right, and ought not to be violated by this House, any more than by a court of justice. If this be not
so I ask you, Mr. Speaker, and I ask this House, what is this committee ruled by? What rights have they not? Can they not ask any question they please? It has been so contended ... that they are the sole
judges of what questions may be asked and what shall be answered.
11.

CONG. GLOBE,

12. Id.

40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2669 (1868).

13. The text of the resolution, reciting the testimony of both men and Woolley's
claim of attorney-client privilege, is contained in CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 2669-70 (1868).

14. Id. at 2670.
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Such is not the law. I assert this cannot be so. If it be, then the sacred
relations between husband and wife may be investigated before this
committee . . . .If this be so the relations and communion between
penitent and priest may be'pried into and exposed by the "smelling
committee," and the sacred office of spiritual advisor is destroyed."
Whatever this argument contained in emotion, it lacked in legal
citation. Instead, Congressman Eldridge's argument is nothing more
than a recognition of the fact that the policies justifying the privileges apply to any compelled disclosure. None, however, directly disputed Congressman Eldridge's contention that the privilege applied
to limit the scope of permissible congressional inquiry. Instead, the
only rejoinderwas that Woolley simply lied about his relationship
with Shook. Whether the House disagreed with Congressman Eldridge or merely with the conclusion that the privilege did not apply
is not apparent. What is clear is that the House adopted the resolution and the committee imprisoned Woolley a few days later.,
While the issue arose in somewhat unusual circumstances in the
Woolley case, it demonstrated a pattern that Congress was to repeat. The pattern consisted of not directly asserting that the
claimed privilege was inapplicable as a matter of law, but that the
claimed privilege had not been properly asserted as to the facts of
the case.
B.

The Stewart Case

The pattern reoccurred during the investigations of the Credit
Mobilier affair in 1873.1" Again the subject was bribery of government officials, this time involving legislation to benefit the Union
Pacific Railroad. Again the witness was a lawyer being questioned
about the disposition of funds. A House committee questioned attorney Joseph B. Steward about the identities of persoris to whom
he had given certain funds. Much like Woolley, Stewart stated that
the money was not given to any government official and declined to
respond further, stating that he would "make no statement to the
committee about the business of my clients." ' s
As in the Woolley case, proponents of efforts to punish Stewart
argued that the question did not implicate the attorney-client privilege because Stewart was not acting in a lawyer's capacity when he
delivered the funds to their ultimate destination."0 One member,
15. Id. at 2674.

16. Id. at 2670.
17. Credit Mobilier of America was a company used by officials of the Union

Pacific
finance
18.
19.

Railroad to transfer profits and government benefits otherwise intended to
the railroad. II DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 255-56 (1976).
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Seas. 952 (1873).
Id. at 953-54 (remarks of Congressmen Hoar, Wilson and Poland).
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however, went so far as to suggest that privileges do not apply to the
government.2 0 Stewart was brought to the bar of the House and required to explain his position. He continued his assertion that "all
the matters refused by me to be testified about or disclosed had
their origin solely and exclusively in the relation of counsel and client .

.

. ."" The House voted to send him to jail for contempt.2 2 As

with Woolley, the record was too inconclusive to allow a definite
statement as to whether the House agreed that the privilege was not
properly claimed here or whether it simply did not apply as a matter
of law.
Stewart elected to challenge his captivity and brought suit
against the Speaker and his jailor, the Sergeant at Arms, alleging
assault and false imprisonment.2 In a brief opinion, the court simply ruled that the House had jurisdiction over Stewart. Finding jurisdiction, the court ruled that execution of the resolution to imprison Stewart was a ministerial act for which neither the Speaker
nor the Sergeant at Arms could suffer any liability. The court never
directly addressed the question of the applicability of the attorneyclient privilege in congressional proceedings. Thus, it is impossible
to determine whether the court concluded that the privilege did not
apply to congressional proceedings or whether it simply was improperly invoked in this case. The fact that the court's opinion was confined solely to the question of the House's jurisdiction over the party
and the subject matter, however, suggests that the question of the
validity of the claimed privilege on these facts was, at best, of secondary importance.
C.

The MacCracken Case

Senate investigations into airmail contracts in 1934 led to the
next confrontation involving an assertion of a privilege for confidential communications. Again, the witness was an attorney and the
privilege involved was the attorney-client privilege. William MacCracken was subpoenaed to appear before a Senate committee
chaired by then Senator Hugo Black and to produce certain
20. What is the reason for the rule which makes communications between
counsel and client confidential? The general rule of public policy; that it
would, on the whole, produce more mischief and inconvenience .... But that
rule of public policy can have no application, it seems to me, when the Government itself comes, in the exercise of the highest public policy, to inquire into
corrupt practices by their own officers in regard of the legislation of the Government itself.

Id. (remarks of Congressman Potter).
21. Id. at 982.
22. Id. at 988.
23. Stewart v. Blaine, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453 (1874).
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records.2 ' Rather than produce the records when initially called
before the committee, MacCracken asserted that they fell within the
attorney-client privilege.2 5 He agreed, however, to ask his clients for
authorization to produce the records to the committee.2 6 While most
of the clients assented to disclosure, two persons responded by reviewing MacCracken's files and removing documents that were later
destroyed.2 7 Not surprisingly, this result did not please the committee and the Senate cited MacCracken and his two clients to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for those actions.2"
The contempt proceedings thus turned primarily upon the destruction of documents, not upon MacCracken's assertion of the attorney-client privilege. The question of the applicability of the privilege in the first instance, however, did not escape consideration in
the affair. Senator King expressed the clear view that the privilege
was inapplicable in the legislative arena stating: "The question of
privilege does not extend to confidential communications between
an attorney and his clients in a legislative investigation, and it
would be for the committee, after examining the records, to determine whether they are pertinent or material."29
Other members took a different approach. Senator MacCarren
expressed the view that MacCracken was not acting in the capacity
of counsel in the events subject to the committee's inquiries and
that the privilege did not apply.2 Senator Black agreed, and also
suggested that MacCracken was acting in furtherance of an illegal
conspiracy, which negated the validity of a privilege claim.3 1 Ultimately, the Senate determined to confine MacCracken in the
Capitol."2
MacCracken then brought suit against the Sergeant at Arms of
the Senate seeking release. Because he was not held in contempt for
refusing to produce allegedly privileged documents, but rather for
aiding in their destruction after the issuance of a subpoena, the
question of privilege was not involved. Indeed, by the time MacCracken's challenge reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis
was able to state that "[t]he claim of privilege . . . is no longer an
24. 78 CONG. REC. 1852 (1934).
25. Id. at 2402.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 2402-03.
28. S. Res. 172, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).

29. 78 CONG. REc. 2403.
30. Id. For example, one of the events critical to the committee's inquest was a
meeting between representatives of different airlines and the Postmaster General. Id.

at 2405-06.
31. Id. at 2404.
32. The proceedings leading to the order to confine MacCracken were closed.

Id. at 2461.
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issue. '' 3
D.

A McCarthy Era Postscript

The excesses of the McCarthy era caused a reexamination of
the procedures for congressional committees. Considered at that
time, among a host of other proposals, was a suggestion to incorporate into the Senate rules an explicit recognition of the confidential
status of communications traditionally protected in judicial proceedings.' The proposal prompted some favorable comment, based on
the fact that the same policy concerns justifying the privileges in the
first instance apply equally in both the legislative and judicial
arenas:
[S]ection 3(d) of Senate Resolution 256 establishes as privileged all
communications between clergymen and parishioner, doctor and patient, lawyer and client, and husband and wife. There is no justification for permitting easy invasion by congressional investigators of the
privileges against testifying that are scrupulously observed in our
criminal courts, and, that in every case have been predicated upon
precepts fundamental to our Anglo-American law. These privileges
have not been frivolously evolved: they are not impediments to the
trial of issues. On the contrary, in each instance they embody a basic
concept whose maintenance has been found crucial to the determination of just conclusions.3"
Ultimately, however, the Senate decided not to enact such a
rule. The rationale for this decision, as expressed by the Senate
committee report, aptly summarizes the history of congressional
treatment of privileges and the uncertain legal status of the privileges before Congress, an uncertainty that remains today:
With few exceptions, it has been committee practice to observe the
testimonial privileges of witnesses with respect to communications between clergyman and parishioner, doctor and patient, lawyer and client, and husband and wife. Controversy does not appear to have
arisen in this connection. While the policy behind the protection of
confidential communication may be applicable to legislative investigations as well as to court proceedings, no rule appear [sic] to be necessary at this time. 6
33. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 144 (1935). Instead, MacCracken
chiefly argued that the Senate lacked the power to punish a contempt for the sake of
punishment alone and unrelated to an effort to compel compliance with the underlying legislative demand. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Senate's exercise of
the contempt power in such circumstances.
34. S. Res. 256, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
35. Rules of Procedure for Senate Investigating Committees, Hearings Before
the Senate Subcommittee on Rules of the Committee on Rules and Administration,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1954) (testimony of Will Maslow, General Counsel, American
Jewish Congress).
36. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SENATE INVESTIGATING COMMIrrEEs, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 27 (Comm. Print 1955). The only "exception" to Congressional respect for privi-
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This statement is significant for two reasons. First, it highlights
the congressional practice of seeking to avoid confrontation over
privilege claims, as discussed above. Second, it indicates some uncertainty over the applicability of the privileges in congressional proceedings as a matter of law. The decision not to adopt the proposal,
according to the Report, is based on practical considerations of a
history of accommodation even though the Report frankly acknowledges that the policy concerns justifying privileges are equally applicable when the privilege is claimed in a legislative context.37

III.

EXPERIENCE IN OTHER FORUMS

As shown above, congressional experience with evidentiary privileges for confidential communications is hardly extensive or especially definitive. Experience in other jurisdictions and legislatures
sheds little light and is, unfortunately, equally unsatisfactory in determining the scope of congressional power.
For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court has suggested,
without deciding, that the attorney-client privilege could validly
limit an inquiry by a state legislative body investigating alleged
bribery."8 On the other hand, in reviewing the limits of a similar
legislative investigation of a bribery scheme, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court indicated, without deciding, that "[i]t could be very unwise to
confine the legislature in its investigations to the same strict rules of
evidence which prevail in courts of law."3
English practice has been less ambiguous. As early as 1856, one
writer was able to state without equivocation that when called
before Parliament, "[A] witness cannot excuse himself from answering on the ground that. . . [the] matter was a privileged communication to him, as where an attorney is called upon to disclose the
secrets of his clients ... .""o Moreover, English courts have elected
to let Parliament define the issue of what can be punished as a conleged communications referred to in the Report was the MacCracken affair discussed

above.
37. Just two years earlier, however, the court in United States v. Keeney, 111 F.
Supp. 233, 234-35 (D.D.C. 1953), in reviewing a claim of privilege by an employee of
the United Nations based on United Nations' regulations, seemed to accept without
question the proposition that evidentiary privileges apply in congressional proceedings. The issue was not material to a decision in the case, however, and, in any event,
was later reversed on procedural grounds. Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
38. Sullivan v. Hill, 79 S.E. 670, 672 (W. Va. 1913).
39. In Re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630, 642 (1858).
40. CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 983, § 1001 (1856). Cushing states that this result is
based, at least in part, on the distinction between a house of Parliament acting in its
capacity as a court and as a legislature, with rules of evidence applying in the former
but not the latter. Id. § 985.
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tempt of the legislature."1 As discussed in the following section, however, the English experience, although part of the common law tradition, does not control the outcome here. Rather, the answer lies in
the Constitution.
IV.

PRIVILEGES AND CONGRESS-A PROPOSED ANALYSIS

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, neither historical
practice nor legal precedent supplies a ready answer to the basic
question of whether traditional privileges for confidential communications limit congressional inquiries. Both Congress and the privileges have managed to coexist peacefully for the greater part for
over two hundred years, with the few exceptions noted above. That
result could just as easily follow from a binding principle that the
privileges apply in the legislative context, a result at odds with the
English rule noted above, as tacit acquiescence in the privileges."2
Moreover, while the result may appear to be the same, the question
is not without significance. A result that denies the applicability of
the privilege as a matter of law can directly affect efforts to claim a
privilege. As a practical matter, a clear difference exists between the
ability to claim an established privilege that is binding on Congress
and the need to persuade a committee to respect a privilege recognized as binding on the courts alone but which the committee, as a
matter of law, is free to ignore.
Privileges for confidential communications rest on the policy
grounds that confidentiality is needed to preserve basic relationships
for which society accords a favored status. These policies clearly apply in congressional proceedings. The Constitution gives to Congress
the power to determine whether to give effect to those policies.
The Constitution gives to each house of Congress the authority
to establish its own rules of proceedings.'3 Except to the extent that
other constitutional provisions limit Congress," this clause empowers Congress to control its own procedural rules.' 5 Although the is41. Burdett v. Abbot, 104 Eng. Rep. 501; 14 East. 1, 150 (1811); Case of the
Sheriff of Middlesex, 11 Ad. & El. 273, 291 (1840); Rex v. Hobhouse, 2 Chitty's L.
Rep. 207 (1820).
42. This result seems to be the conclusion of the Senate Report on the proposals following the McCarthy era noted earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 3538.
43. Art. I, § 5, cl. 2 of the Constitution provides: "Each House may determine
the Rules of its Proceedings ......
44. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4 for a discussion of the limited protections of witnesses before Congress.
45. Indeed, not all constitutional guarantees that limit judicial proceedings apply to congressional inquiries. For example, congressional witnesses have no right to
cross-examine witnesses, even though, as a practical matter, a congressional witness
can be as much a defendant in a committee investigation as any criminal defendant
who enjoys full constitutional guarantees. See United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670
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sue has never been raised, this power would also permit Congress to
choose to respect or invade the sanctity of confidential communications as it pleases, provided that no constitutional guarantee is
infringed.
Congress' constitutional power to make its own rules of procedure supports this result. The Supreme Court examined the parameters of Congress' constitutional power to adopt rules of procedure
in United States v.Ballin,46 a case involving a challenge to the validity of a statute passed unanimously by the House, but with a majority of members not voting.' 7 A House rule permitted such a procedure, thus necessitating a review of the validity of the rule. The
Supreme Court took an expansive view of the House's power to
adopt its own rules:
[T]he advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule
[do not] present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rule
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of either house.'9
In an effort to avoid discriminating between the two houses, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Smith,'" took an equally expansive view of the power of the Senate, stating that the "Constitution
commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not
the function of the Court to say that another rule would be better."
More recently, in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,"0 the District of Columbia
Circuit stated that "Article I simply means that neither we nor the
Executive Branch may tell Congress what rules it must adopt."5 1
It is difficult to square the view that Congress is bound to follow
the privileges for confidential communications, especially for privileges that are wholly or partly created by the common law, with the
language of these cases. 2 For example, to maintain that the attorney-client privilege applies to Congress as a matter of law admits
that the courts can fashion rules that bind Congress because the attorney-client privilege is a common law rule.
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).
46. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id.
49. 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1942).
50. 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1173.
52. Although the courts will not adopt rules for Congress, they will enforce the
rules that Congress has chosen to follow. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84
(1949); Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1173.
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Moreover, this view of the scope of the rights of witnesses in
congressional proceedings is consistent with both the precedent of
limiting congressional inquiries through constitutional guarantees58
and the conclusion that Congress is not bound to follow the traditional privileges for confidential communications. Nothing in the
Constitution compels Congress to respect privileged communications. Indeed, no one would dispute that Congress could adopt legislation affecting the role of privileges in judicial proceedings.5 4 It follows, then, that Congress is not required to follow those privileges in
its own arena.
Concluding that Congress' constitutional power to make its own
rules means that Congress is not bound to follow traditional rules
for privileged communications does not end the matter, especially in
light of Congress' historical practice of respecting those privileges.
That the intuitive response of most, to the initial query of whether
the privileges apply in the first instance to Congress, is most likely
an affirmative one simply underscores that the relationships protected enjoy such a special status in society. Clearly, Congress, by its
nature, is called upon to respond to concerns and interests beyond
simple considerations of the scope of its constitutional authority.
The same considerations, which led to the creation of the privileges
in the first instance, must necessarily affect congressional decisionmaking in a practical political sense. Moreover, a decision to invade
those relationships by compelling witnesses to disclose communications in traditionally protected confidential relationships must necessarily entail adverse responses and raise questions regarding the
legitimacy of the inquiries in the first instance. It is this political
accommodation of interests, not fundamental limitations on congressional power, that has resulted in the "committee practice to observe the testimonial privileges of witnesses" referred to by the 1054
Senate Report. 5
V. CONCLUSION
Recognition of the extent of Congress' constitutional power
should guide those involved in these matters. In litigation, the role
of privileges is usually clear. Conflict over the assertion of a privilege
is familiar, and appeal to a judicial authority able to resolve the
matter is available. Once the nature of Congress' power and the role
53. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10 for a discussion of the husbandwife and doctor-patient privileges as they relate to forums.
54. Arguably, the sixth amendment restricts Congress in regulating the confidentiality of attorney-client communications in criminal proceedings so as to deny

the effective assistance of counsel.

55. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of an exception
to congressional respect for privileged communication.
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of privileges are realized, however, it should be clear that a different
approach is required before Congress. Posturing for a confrontation
is useless because Congress is both the opponent and the judge.
Rather than a confrontational approach, the better course is to seek
conciliation and compromise with arguments based on the policies
underlying the privileges. Confrontations should be avoided because
Congress will no doubt ultimately prevail.

